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The article discusses the protection regime for clinical trial data 
internationally and outlines the applicable protection regime. In 
doing so, this article outlines how the data exclusivity regime can 
operate in parallel with the patent regime to add a layer of 
protection for the data. Such protection operates at a regulatory 
level to delay the entry of generic medications. Internationally, the 
data exclusivity regime, which has become an important 
contemporary tool in trade negotiations with poorer nations, works 


















































The Drug Debate: Data Exclusivity is the New Way 
to Delay Generics  
PROFESSOR SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN* 
Suppose that the morning edition of the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported about “Company A’s” 
new miracle medication, “Drug A,” to cure acne. Clinical trials 
conducted on over 3,000 patients showed that Drug A was 
generally safe, although teenagers with higher than normal blood 
sugar levels may suffer from mild to severe depression as a side 
effect. In reality, it might be good for the reader to appreciate that 
independent drug information journals repeatedly assert that the 
rate of “truly innovative” new medicines range as low as 
approximately two percent.1 A vast majority of so-called new 
medicines, including those that are protected by patents, typically 
represent minor improvements over existing standards.2 That 
information aside, any drug, including the exemplar Drug A, 
would be subject to regulatory approvals. Thus, in this scenario, 
Company A submitted the clinical trial information as part of the 
                                                          
*Srividhya Ragavan is a Professor of Law specializing in intellectual property 
and international trade law at Texas A&M University School of Law. She can 
be contacted at ragavan.sri@law.tamu.edu. 
 
1 See Brian Godman, et al., Are New Models Needed to Optimize the 
Utilization of New Medicines to Sustain Healthcare Systems?, 8 (1) EXPERT 
REV.CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 77, 78 (2015) (highlighting that “Prescrire, a 
critical independent drug information journal, believed only 2% of new 
medicines or new indications for existing medicines in France were innovative 
and/or offered a real therapeutic advantage over existing treatments despite the 
hype”) (citation omitted). 
2  See Editorial, New Drugs, New Indications in 2015: Little Progress, and 
Threats to Access to Quality Healthcare for All, 36 (388) PRESCRIRE INT’L 
136, 136 (2016), 
english.prescrire.org/en/3D3B93E1C3DE20A599FBA073C5442463/Downloa
d.aspx; see also  Editorial, New Products and New Indications in 2016: A 
System that Favours Imitation Over the Pursuit of Real Progress, 37 (400) 
PRESCRIRE INT’L 136, 136 (2017), 
english.prescrire.org/en/955912A2E87C92B676874FA2C1354846/Download.
aspx [hereinafter New Products, 2016] (“[L]ittle therapeutic progress was 
made in 2016, yet many medicines with no clinical value, uncertain efficacy 
or an unfavourable harm-benefit balance were authorised. This is due at least 
in part to the current system that drives pharmaceutical research and 
development. The primary focus is neither on patients’ needs nor on 








statutory requirements for getting marketing approval for Drug 
A.  
Clinical trial data submitted to federal agencies in support 
of the application to approve the marketing of the compound is 
critical to prove important elements such as safety and side 
effects information of the concerned drug. This article discusses 
the protection regime for clinical trial data and the applicable 
protection regime. In doing so, this article outlines how the data 
exclusivity regime can operate in parallel with the patent regime 
to add a layer of protection for the clinical trial data. Such 
protection operates at a regulatory level to detrimentally affect 
access to medication by delaying the entry of generic 
medications. Furthermore, the data exclusivity regime, which has 
become an important contemporary tool in trade negotiations 
with poorer nations, works internationally to detrimentally affect 
access to medication.   
The historic origin of the requirement that protects the 
exclusivity of Company A’s clinical trial data arose from unfair 
competition concerns originally outlined in Article 10bis of the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.3 In 
essence, Article 10bis establishes “honest practices in industrial 
or commercial matters,”4 and prevents actions such as dishonest 
manufacturing and other practices that mislead the public as to 
the nature and quality of the goods.5 When the World Trade 
Organization (WTO)6 was established, the TRIPS Agreement7 
incorporated the Paris Convention. Thus, Article 39 (3) of the 
                                                          
3 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10bis, Mar. 20, 




6 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
(The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade 
Organization [World Trade Organization], 33 I.L.M 13 (1994) [hereinafter 
Marrakesh Agreement]; see also The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2018), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (providing an overview 
of the WTO).  
7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1C, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), reprinted in WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL 
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement];  
see also Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm; Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 19 
U.S.C. § 4201 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 
 





TRIPS Agreement provides protection for “undisclosed test or 
other data” submitted to governments or “governmental 
agencies” as part of the approval process for marketing of 
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products which utilize 
new chemical entities.8 The protection is envisaged against unfair 
commercial use of “undisclosed test or other data” involving new 
chemical entities generated using “considerable effort” and 
submitted to government regulators such as the US Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) or its equivalent in other countries.9 
There is one exception, however, and it applies where the 
disclosure of the data is deemed necessary to “protect the 
public.”10  
Operationally, the data exclusivity regime provides a 
layer of protection for the data gathered by innovator drug 
companies. This protection regime for data  operates outside the 
realm of patent protection. Thus, the exemplar Company A above 
will have two distinct, parallel layers of protection. First, subject 
to fulfilling the necessary statutory requirements, Company A 
will benefit from patent protection which, if successful, will 
allow the company to charge monopoly prices during the patent 
term of 20 years.11 Second, Company A will get protection over 
the clinical trial data preventing the disclosure of the clinical trial 
information during the data exclusivity term.  
For innovator pharmaceutical companies like Company 
A, protecting the clinical trial data provides an economic 
opportunity by creating a new market for the information relating 
to the safety of the drug. It also helps provide market exclusivity 
for compounds that fail patent scrutiny. Critics point out, 
correctly, that pharmaceutical companies prefer to make general 
trial information available at the earliest opportunity with a view 
to boosting share prices. For example, with Drug A it would be 
common for Company A to highlight general trial information 
about the drug, such as its ability to cure acne with few side 
effects, while omitting severe side effects on segments of the 
population, such as minors using asthma medication or children 
with diabetes.12 The general amount of clinical trial information 
                                                          
8 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7, at art. 39. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 See generally 35 U.S.C. §101–130. 
12 But see New Products, 2016, supra note 2, at 138–39 (asserting how new 
products in the year 2016 represented no or limited therapeutic advancement 
and discussing how pharmaceuticals are approved for applications without 
demanding adequate supporting data of clinical trials). 
 
 




about drugs is increasing and is pro-actively tracked by health 
authorities and venture capitalists for market related reasons, 
such as to determine potential funding models.13 Release of 
limited but early trial information can allow pharmaceutical 
companies to seek more funding for the launch of their new 
medicines. However, general disclosures by pharmaceutical 
companies aimed at securing funding should be carefully 
distinguished from patient data that includes side-effects and 
success information, which will remain protected under data 
protection laws.   
Justification for the protection of clinical trial data is 
owed to the success of innovator pharmaceuticals in asserting 
that the costs of undertaking clinical trials are considerable, and 
can run up to four separate phases involving several patients, 
their confidential information, and varying treatment regimes that 
can include information on side effects and safety regimens of 
the medication. That is, innovator pharmaceutical companies 
assert that Company A’s investment to ensure that Drug A is safe 
by conducting clinical trials must include the protection of the 
generated data. This logic, of course, stands on shaky ground 
considering that Company A would typically seek patent 
protection, which, if successful, leads to monopoly profits during 
the patent term meant to recoup “research and development” 
expenses.14 Clinical trials are part of the development process to 
                                                          
13 There is an increasing level of pro-activity among health authorities in 
Europe to track new medicines early and feed this information into their 
potential funding models. See, e.g., Irene Eriksson et al., The Early Awareness 
and Alert System in Sweden: History and Current Status, FRONTIERS IN 
PHARMACOLOGY 8:674, at 1, Oct. 5, 2017, 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fphar.2017.00674; see also Rickard Malmström et 
al., Dabigatran - A Case History Demonstrating the Need for Comprehensive 
Approaches to Optimize the Use of New Drugs, FRONTIERS IN 
PHARMACOLOGY 4:39 at 2, May 14, 2013,  
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3653065/ (discussing 
the sharing of data between European countries). 
14 The role of patent protection in minor innovation and how it detrimentally 
affects the cost of medication has become a matter of debate. Researchers and 
international organizations have highlighted the importance of access to 
medication. See, e.g., Camille Abboud et al., The Price of Drugs for Chronic 
Myeloid Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the Unsustainable Prices of 
Cancer Drugs: From the Perspective of a Large Group of CML Experts, 121 
BLOOD JOURNAL 4439, 4441 (2013), 
http://www.bloodjournal.org/content/121/22/4439?sso-checked=true (noting 
that “[u]naffordable CML drug prices may be preventing many patients from 
accessing these lifesaving drugs.”); see also Report of the United Nations 
Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Access to Medicines, at 15 (Sep. 
 
 





ensure the safety of a chemical compound. That is, clinical trials 
determine whether the innovated New Chemical Entity, for 
which a patent is filed, is safe to be marketed as a medication. 
Conducting clinical trials should therefore be a natural part of the 
risk that innovator companies undertake in order to gain the 
enormous market benefits that come with patent protection.  
Nevertheless, most governments award a drug company 
that undertakes clinical trials, typically the innovator drug 
company, with a period of “exclusivity” which can range 
anywhere from three to eight years.15 In the United States, for 
example, the FDA grants New Chemical Entities a total data 
exclusivity period of up to five years.16 That is, during the term 
when data exclusivity prevails, competing drug companies 
cannot get access to the clinical trial data. Importantly, such 
access to data is unavailable even when the patent application 
fails. Taking the example above, even if Company A’s 
compound is found to be unpatentable for whatever reasons, and 
hence falls in the public domain, the data from the clinical trial 
will remain protected, thus indirectly awarding Company A 
market exclusivity. In stock market parlance, this is a situation 
where even though the pharmaceutical company has taken a bad 
risk in the form of a patent application, data exclusivity provides 
adequate insurance for a few years of market exclusivity. Even 
                                                                                                                               
2016), http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/ (noting that “[c]ost is one 
of the key determinants of access.”); Ed Silverman, Hepatitis C Drugs Remain 
Unaffordable in Many Countries, Says WHO Study, STATNEWS, May 31, 
2016, https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/31/gilead-hepatitis-drug-
prices-who/ (noting that, for diseases like hepatitis C, in some countries where 
drug prices are high, “the total cost of treating everyone would be more than 
the cost of all other medicines combined.”); Press Release, World Health 
Organization, Over 1 Million Treated With Highly Effective Hepatitis C 
Medicines (Oct. 27, 2016), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/hepatitis-c-medicines/en/ 
(noting “huge differences between what countries are paying” for hepatitis C 
drugs); Narcyz Ghinea et al., If We Don’t Talk About Value, Cancer Drugs 
Will Become Terminal for Health Systems,  THE CONVERSATION, July 26, 
2015, http://theconversation.com/if-we-dont-talk-about-value-cancer-drugs-
will-become-terminal-for-healthsystems-44072 (discussing a group of 
oncologists urging patients to talk about the price of medications). 
15 See 21 U.S.C § 355(b)(1)–(2) under which applications for a new chemical 
entity can receive five years of exclusivity; U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON PATENTS AND 
EXCLUSIVITY (2018),   
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm#h
owlongexclusivity (noting a range of exclusivity terms depending on the 








though patent protection has failed, which means that a generic 
version can be manufactured legally, the clinical trial data 
remains protected, thus indirectly providing Company A market 
exclusivity on a product which does not enjoy patent protection. 
Therefore, generic drug applications of the drug will be delayed, 
not because there is a patent on the drug, but because the clinical 
trial information is protected by data exclusivity. In this scenario, 
generic drug companies are not allowed to access the information 
related to a chemical that is in the public domain. For consumers, 
Company A’s market exclusivity comes at a financial cost, as 
well as at the cost of access to the medication. Of course, generic 
drug companies are free to conduct their own clinical trials, 
considering that the drug is not a subject of patent protection. 
However, such duplication of clinical trials will result in 
subjecting a new set of patients to the same clinical trials and 
involves additional cost to conduct the trials and delays in 
manufacturing the generic drug while trials are being conducted. 
Thus, generic drug companies duplicating a clinical trial already 
conducted elsewhere will result in duplicative burdens in terms 
of time and cost. While the cost of the trial will be added to the 
cost of the drug and passed onto consumers by raising the cost of 
generic drugs unnecessarily, the delay from duplicating the 
clinical trial will result in delaying access to the consumers.  
Under circumstances where a chemical gets patent 
protection, data exclusivity regimes have slowly morphed into a 
weapon resulting in a slow increase in the period of data 
exclusivity. For example, in the United States, along with the 
original exclusivity awarded for New Chemical Entities, a six 
month paediatric exclusivity is added to any existing drug. This 
extension attaches at the end of the term if the sponsor submits 
paediatric studies on the active moiety in response to a Written 
Request from the FDA.17 Similarly, a separate period of seven 
years of exclusivity can be awarded under the Orphan Drugs Act 
for each use of the drug to treat an orphan condition.18 Recent 
                                                          
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 284m21(c) (2012) (describing that the Commissioner of 
Food and Drugs can issue written requests for paediatric studies); 21 U.S.C. § 
355a(b)(1) (2012) (stating that “the period during which an application may 
not be approved . . . shall be extended by a period of six months after the date 
the patent expires[.]”). 
18 Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm; 









research has suggested rampant misuse of this enactment by 
companies. National Public Radio reported that more than 
seventy drugs approved as Orphan Drugs were in fact “familiar 
brand names.”19 Such examples include popular mass market 
drugs, such as “the cholesterol blockbuster Crestor, Abilify for 
psychiatric conditions, cancer drug Herceptin, and rheumatoid 
arthritis drug Humira, the best-selling medicine in the world.”20 
Each of these represented the re-approval of a mass market drug 
as an orphan drug when its patent was about to expire. Similarly, 
there have been instances where the same drug received multiple 
“orphan approvals.”22 The approval of drugs with a new orphan 
status has caused manufacturers to receive millions of dollars in 
government incentives.23 The problem with this is that the seven 
additional years of data exclusivity creates a monopoly over a 
drug which already benefitted from patent protection, as well as 
one layer of data exclusivity, for treating another disease.24 
As patents and high drug prices have become increasingly 
unpopular,26 pharmaceutical companies and interest groups have 
                                                                                                                               
ons/HowtoapplyforOrphanProductDesignation/ucm364750.htm (last updated 
Aug. 2013). 
19 Sarah Jane Tribble & Sydney Lupkin, Drugs For Rare Diseases Have 





22 Id.  
23 Id 
24 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Alan Haycox et al., Patent expiry and costs for anti-cancer 
medicines for clinical use : expiry and costs anti-cancer medicines. 6 
GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J. 105 (2017), http://gabi-
journal.net/patent-expiry-and-costs-for-anticancer-medicines-for-clinical-
use.html (finding drastically increased prices for cancer drugs to have only 
“marginal health gains” compared with lower priced drugs developed 
previously); Donald W. Light & Hagop Kantarjian, Market Spiral Pricing of 
Cancer Drugs, 119 CANCER 3900, 3900 (2013), 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/ 10.1002/cncr.28321/ (arguing that “cancer 
drugs should be priced lower” because there is no data to support the position 
that higher prices correlate with added value in new cancer drugs); Ayalew 
Tefferi et al., In Support of a Patient-Driven Initiative and Petition to Lower 
the High Price of Cancer Drugs, 90 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 996, 997 (2015), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2015.06.001 (warning that high drug 
prices “ultimately harm[] patients with cancer and our health care system”); 
Narcyz Ghinea et al., If We Don’t Talk About Value, Cancer Drugs Will 
Become Terminal for Health Systems, THE CONVERSATION (July 26, 2015, 
4:12 PM), http://theconversation.com/if-we-dont-talk-about-value-cancer-
drugs-will-become-terminal-for-healthsystems-44072 (giving examples of 
 
 




helped morph data exclusivity into a more potent weapon more 
often than not, to the detriment of cost of medication and access 
to medication.27 The much higher standard of data exclusivity 
sought under the now-failed Trans-Pacific Partnership is a great 
example.28 In both trade negotiations and free trade agreements 
with other countries, the US tends to prefer definitions that 
interpret Article 39 of TRIPS more stringently, in a manner 
requiring a much higher data protection requirement. The 
important aspect to remember is that such compromises need not 
be emulated in every market, especially in countries that have a 
policy focus on enabling access to medication.29    
                                                                                                                               
prominent oncologists in the US and Australia criticizing the rising cost of 
cancer medications). 
27 E.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Data Exclusivity: A Tool to Sustain Market 
Monopoly, 3(5) JINDAL L. REV. 1 (2017); see also Srividhya Ragavan, The 
Significance of the Data Exclusivity Debate and its Impact on Generic Drugs, 
1 J. INTELL. PROP. STUD. 131, 133–34 (2017) (“Data submitted for marketing 
of pharmaceutical . . . products is treated differently partly because of the 
powerful lobbies of pharmaceutical corporations and interests they represent 
worldwide.”). 
28 See Kristina Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t Enough: The Case for Data 
Exclusivity for Biologic Medicines, IPWATCHDOG (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/09/patents-arent-enough-data-
exclusivity-for-biologic-medicines/id=50318/ (“Protecting the intellectual 
property of biologics is . . . one of the remaining hurdles in the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) Trade Agreement negotiations.”); What Does the TPP Say 
About Data Exclusivity and Biosimilars?, MANAGED CARE, 
https://www.managedcaremag.com/focus/what-does-tpp-say-about-data-
exclusivity-and-biosimilars (last visited Apr. 5, 2018) (providing a 
contemporaneous account of the TPP negotiations with respect to data 
exclusivity). 
29 See, e.g., Winnie de Bruijn et al., Introduction and Utilization of 
High Priced HCV Medicines across Europe; Implications for the 
Future, FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY, July 2016, at 7, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/ PMC4964878/ 
(explaining that “risk sharing agreements and discounts are used 
by health authorities to control budgets, enabling patients to have 
access to new high priced medicines”); Maria Phelan & Catherine 
Cook, A Treatment Revolution for Those Who Can Afford It? 
Hepatitis C treatment: New Medications, Profits and Patients, 14 
BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES S5 (Supp. 6 2014), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4178584/ 
(discussing how a pharmaceutical company allowed some 
countries to make these new medicines available at cost for their 
populations or appreciable discounts); Srividhya Ragavan, 
Comment, Patients Win Over Patents, HINDU, Mar. 7, 2013, 
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/ op-ed/patients-win-over-
patents/article4482469.ece (last updated July 21, 2016) 
(summarizing an example of Indian government authorities 
 
 





The question of implementing Article 39 of TRIPS has 
current significance for WTO members that are developing 
countries. While WTO members have an obligation to protect 
data submitted to regulatory bodies, the main objective of Article 
39.3’s prescription is to provide members the freedom to define 
the terms flexibly.30 Thus, WTO members that are developing 
countries should carefully define elements of the article such as 
“undisclosed test data,” or, constituents of “unfair commercial 
use” in a manner facilitating access to medication.31 For instance, 
under the Article 39.3 while members are required to protect data 
“against disclosure,” there is nothing to suggest that disclosing 
the data to a government regulator should be construed as “unfair 
commercial use.” Similarly, WTO members should carve out 
clear public interest exceptions to allow for the use of the data. 
Developing countries should also follow the pre-TRIPS position 
under which most countries allowed reliance on innovator test 
data to approve generic products.32 Generic manufacturers had to 
prove bioequivalence, which is that that their product was 
chemically identical to the brand-name, original product.33 This 
approach was consumer-friendly in that it enabled introduction of 
generics into the market as soon as the patent expired. The 
importance of preserving this traditional approach is underscored 
by the recent UN High Level Panel Report on Access to 
Medicines,34 the WIPO Development Agenda,35 and the WHO 
                                                                                                                               
compelling a multinational pharmaceutical company to license 
one of its patented drugs to a local generic manufacturer to ensure 
reasonable pricing);  Srividhya Ragavan & Raj Dave, Opinion, 
The Right Prescription to the IPR Debate, HINDUSTAN TIMES, 
Sep. 29, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-view/the-right-
prescription-in-the-ipr-debate/story-
aEvB8EGLIsoweSdpozDwBI.html (summarizing the Indian 
government’s program of voluntary and compulsory licensing of 
high-cost patented drugs). 
30 Wael Armouti & Mohammad F.A. Nsour, Data Exclusivity for 
Pharmaceuticals: Was It the Best Choice for Jordan Under the U.S.-Jordan 
Free Trade Agreement?, 17 OR. REV. INT’L L. 259, 260 (2016). 
31 Id.; see also WTO & the Trips Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/wto_trips/en/.  
32TRIPS Agreement, supra note 7. 
33 See Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 27, at 16–17. 
34 See Report of the United Nations High Level Panel Report on Access to 
Medicines, UNITED NATIONS, (Sept. 2016), 
http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/. 
35 See generally Development Agenda for WIPO, WORLD INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/. 
 
 




studies,36 all of which also highlight the importance of access to 
medicines. It is a documented fact that generics have not only 
been able to save costs, but also enable access to medication in 
several parts of the world.37  
Lastly, developing countries should avoid instituting 
“patent linkage,” the tying-in of patent information with data 
exclusivity.38 Countries such as the United States provide for 
patent linkage, which essentially prevents regulators such as the 
FDA from approving a competing product during the patent 
term.39 When a generic drug company submits an application to 
get marketing approval, the FDA will process the application 
only if there is no valid patent on the application material. When 
                                                          
36 See Ed Silverman, Hepatitis C Drugs Remain Unaffordable in Many 
Countries, Says WHO Study, STAT: PHARMALOT (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/31/gilead-hepatitis-drug-prices-
who/ (discussing a WHO study that examined the 2015 prices for certain 
drugs in over 30 countries); Over 1 Million Treated with Highly Effective 
Hepatitis C Medicines, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 27, 2016), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/hepatitis-c-medicines/en/ 
(discussing a WHO report on access to Hepatitis C treatments). 
37 See, e.g., Alexandra Cameron et al., Switching from Originator Brand 
Medicines to Generic Equivalents in Selected Developing Countries: How 
Much Could Be Saved?, 15 VALUE IN HEALTH 664, 671 (2012) (explaining the 
results of a study demonstrating the cost-effectiveness of generics and urging 
governments to “consider intervening . . . to improve access to affordable 
medicines”); Brian Godman et al., Multiple Policies to Enhance Prescribing 
Efficiency for Established Medicines in Europe with a Particular Focus on 
Demand Side Measures: Findings and Future Implications, 5 FRONTIERS IN 
PHARMACOLOGY 1, 5–6 (2014) (highlighting some of the policies that Europe 
pursued to maintain universal health care); Brian Godman et al., Payers 
Endorse Generics to Enhance Prescribing Efficiency: Impact and Future 
Implications, a Case History Approach, 1 GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS 
INITIATIVE J. 69, 75 (2012) (asserting that the savings from generics when 
compared with the originator are considerable); Generics Could Cut Costs of 
Cancer Drugs by Over 99%, GENERICS & BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE (Apr. 4, 
2017), http://www.gabionline.net/Generics/Research/Generics-could-cut-
costs-of-cancer-drugs-by-over-99 (describing a study that suggested 
“significant price reductions” for cancer drugs through the use of generics).  
38 Ravikant Bhardwaj et al., The Impact of Patent Linkage on Marketing of 
Generic Drugs, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. RTS. 316, 316 (2013); G. Lee Skillington 
& Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by Article 
39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 34 (2003). 
39 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E), (j)(5)(F) (2012) (providing limited 
protection from competition for new drug applications); see also Small 
Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug Product 
Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 11, 2016), 
https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssi
stance/ucm069962.htm (explaining 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E), (j)(5)(F), also 
known as “new drug product exclusivity”). 
 
 





the Hatch-Waxman Act was enacted in the United States in 1984, 
innovator pharmaceutical companies realized that they could not 
deny generic drugs market access for much longer and hence, 
patent linkage was proposed as an alternative to delay the entry 
of generic competition.40 
Developing countries should appreciate that patent 
linkage results in delaying the entry of generic competition 
because marketing approval cannot be obtained for 
manufacturing the product until the patent expires. Thus, from 
the time the patent expires and until the generic drug is cleared 
for the market, the innovator will indirectly enjoy a market 
monopoly even after the patent expires. Therefore, countries such 
as India, which predominantly houses a generic drug industry, 
and other countries such as Brazil and Chile, which provide 
Universal Health Coverage, would be disadvantaged by patent 
linkage because it largely serves to delay generic drug companies 
from entering into the market. One of the best examples for 
determining the question of patent linkage is India where the 
question arose in relation to the approval of a generic version of 
“sorafenib tosylate” used to treat renal cell cancer.41 Bayer, the 
patent owner, wanted India to prevent Cipla from being granted 
marketing approval.42 Bayer asserted that the TRIPS Agreement 
necessitated the establishment of patent linkage to prevent the 
Drug Controller from approving the marketing of drugs whose 
patent was not owned by the applicant, Cipla. The Delhi High 
Court was persuaded by the presence of a Bolar Provision under 
Section 107A of the Indian Patents Act of 1970, which 
specifically exempted the use of data for regulatory approval 
from infringement with a view to permit immediate availability 
of generic drugs in the market when the patent expires.43 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Delhi 
High Court and rejected the applicability of patent linkage in 
India. Nevertheless, the United States has repeatedly sought to 
                                                          
40 D. Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, There is No Orange Book: The 
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42 Id. at 2. 
43 Id. at 12. 
 
 




pressure India under the Special 301 process to recognize patent 
linkage on the grounds that Article 39 of TRIPS requires it.44  
In reality, patent linkage also affects the operation of 
compulsory licenses, which remains an important tool to tackle 
public health crises in developing countries. When there is a 
public health crisis, the presence of patent linkage can operate to 
prevent a regulator from approving drugs that may be necessary 
to resolve the crisis. Considering that data exclusivity, as a tool, 
detrimentally affects generic competition, it is no coincidence 
that the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 
continually pressures developing countries to either extend or 
increase existing data exclusivity periods.45 Hence, it is 
especially critical that countries appreciate the limits of the 
flexibilities involved in the international obligations relating to 
protection of test data. The bottom line is Article 39.3 of the 
TRIPS Agreement is certainly not worded to impose restrictions 
such that data exclusivity becomes a hurdle to public health. In 
any case, considering that the access-to-medication question has 
become a burden that TRIPS continues to bear poorly, it is 
critical for countries that either focus on access to medication or 
house a robust generic drug industry to chart their own courses 
under Article 39.3. 
  
The End 
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